I've not been able to sketch it out fully yet, but the reason this demonstration of the "block universe" struck me is that it suddenly mapped itself to Klein's sky-earth systems science in my head, and gave me a neat interpretation of how Proclus can say causes are "ancient" with respect to their effects. The basic idea has to do with how the stars we see are "in the past". The relative simultaneity of the sky "surface" shows a temporal priority of that surface to our "present" that is still "simultaneous" with that present moment in which this past is actual to us. That light and all radiation, comes to us from the past, even up to the beginning of the universe. With the perspectivist lens that informs sky-earth systems – such that anywhere one is situated is the “earth” in the middle of a spherical “sky” – horizontal "block" time is instead converted to a "vertical" simultaneity, where one can see the visible instance of eternal causation, and the "eternal instant" of a causal series in terms of temporal priority. The first causes are "ancient" in this manner.
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An entailment of privatio boni is excessus boni. A privation of one good is always a relative "excess" of another. There are no true "gaps" in reality. This is also a way in which a God can be "evil", or more precisely, "wrathful": As an excess leading to "destructive" transformation. Material things are impermanent and fall to "privations" in the light of perpetual being and eternal being, which is always "excessive" in relation to them.
Relatedly, the Pauline idea of "Satan" destroying the body so that the spirit can be saved can hint at a positive role for "the accuser" in a way that would justify him being a real God in the Henadic sense, rather than just a wayward malakim, although one can say that many wayward daimons carry the name of their gods in spreading destruction contrary to the beneficence of Gods.
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When I first learned and understood the idea of polycentric polytheism in Proclus, I didn’t think of the “all in each” existence of the Henads as it is demonstrated in their processions directly. I thought about it in the abstract, apart from their processions, and sometimes read about this as it happens in practice in several traditions. But there is a way to do this, to take this directly from Proclus. After some discussions with Antonio Vargas and some re-reading of certain parts of Butler’s dissertation, here are Proclus’ words, and another interpretation with some entailments of it:
It is necessary therefore, from the before-mentioned axioms, since there is one unity the principle of the whole of things, and from which every hyparxis derives its subsistence, that this unity should produce from itself, prior to all other things, a multitude characterized by unity, and a number most allied to its cause. For if every other cause constitutes a progeny similar to itself prior to that which is dissimilar, much more must The One untold into light after this manner things posterior to itself, since it is beyond similitude, and The One Itself must produce according to union things which primarily proceed from it. For how can The One give subsistence to its progeny except unically? For nature generates things secondary to itself physically, soul psychically, and intellect intellectually. The one therefore is the cause of the whole of things according to union, and the progression from The One is uniform. But if that which primarily produces all things is The One, and the progression from it is unical, it is certainly necessary that the multitude thence produced should be self-perfect unities, most allied to their producing cause. Farther still, if every monad constitutes a number adapted to itself, as was before demonstrated, by a much greater priority must The One generate a number of this kind. For in the progression of things, that which is produced is frequently dissimilar to its producing cause, through the dominion of difference: for such are the last of things, and which are far distant from their proper principles. But the first number, and which is connascent with The One, is uniform, ineffable, superessential, and perfectly similar to its cause. For in the first causes, neither does difference intervening separate from the generator the things begotten, and transfer them into another order, nor does the motion of the cause effecting a remission of power, produce into dissimilitude and indefiniteness the generation of the whole of things, but the cause of all things being unically raised above all motion and division, has established about itself a divine number, and has united it to its own simplicity. The one therefore prior to beings has given subsistence to the unities of beings. (The Theology of Plato; Trans. Thomas Taylor; Book III, Chapter I. Pg 177)
Ontically, the more universal cause produces the less universal cause. The last things in a vertical series are then, "less similar" than the first things to their originating monad. However, the One is not an ontic cause. Granting that this series is also a series of Gods, one has to ask whether these Gods are reducible to these ontic essences. Meaning, is the first Principle Essence? The Platonic answer is "No". One reason is that "to be" and "to be One" are not identical (contra Aristotle). Logically, if they are separable, it entails that one is superior. The inevitable conclusion is that "to be One" is superior to "to be", for even beings that are inferior to the point of having only partial participation in being are still "one". The first Principle is that which covers all things. Being doesn't cover all things, "individuality" (being "one") does.
Thus we can say that, qua individual, each God is not reducible to essence, and thus not reducible to whatever role, less universal or more universal, it has in a given system. What is then the relationship between the first principle and the many individuals (Gods)?
Well, since it is according to essence that Gods are "inferior" or "superior" to one another, we have to find another logic for individuality. It is the case that it is illogical to say an individual thing counts less than "one" with respect to another individual thing. A goat, an atom, and a Star all count "one". Ditto for Gods. The principle of unity (that is, individuality) is subject to the same logic. It cannot "count" more than "one". It also is not subject to the logic of essences, as it is beyond them. While universal essences are distinguished from their products by difference (usually in power), individuality is prior to power, and thus difference. Its "products" are not defined by difference or power. It is thus not "different" from its "products". There's therefore a collapse of "cause and effect". "The One" ends up, by its own logic, as a non-existent entity, except as each individual. The Gods as individuals are thus prior to essence in this manner, and this might entail some things.
There's the fact that the uniqueness of these Gods lies in their individuality prior to any Ontic or Ontological difference. This means that the principle of the identity of Indiscernibles doesn't apply to them. Also, since the Gods are individuals prior to being any particular essence, or even essence as such, there is a corresponding "fluidity" and open-endedness of any system, where roles can be exchanged, expanded, contracted, etc. There's also an accompanying inability to actually count the total number of Gods, since they are not bounded by any system. The "open-endedness" of the system comes with the possibility of adding Gods, and the fluidity comes with the possibility of Gods exchanging and sharing roles. It also gives a different understanding to the "apophatic". Instead of an inaccessible darkness of a "One itself" prior to Henads, it is instead precisely this "open endedness" of a system to an infinite (in eternity) and perpetual (in time) intelligibility of the God, sourced from their individuality, which is circumscribed by no place. Lastly, in accordance with the first implication, the Gods would have to "unite" each other without the logic of essence. Since they are (to borrow a term) "singularities", Unities, they must somehow unite themselves without reducing themselves to some higher entity.
We end up with the fact that, qua individuality, each God is themselves ultimate, omniscient, omnipotent, etc, and that somehow, even if in this or that tradition, the God is associated with this limited thing or place, that God is no less omnipotent in doing so. For me, as a Christian, that might have some applications to the particularities of the Israelite story that is the root of my myths, and as a Yoruba person, give a bridge to that side of my history, with its own religions.