Certain Theses on the “non-thirdness” of Being
We may understand “Being as such” in a predominantly Aristotelian manner, that is, as the ultimate “third term” (to put it crudely). In monotheist metaphysics, this ultimate “Being” is “God”, although due to the nature of such inquiries, it is often denied that this is an entity with a “context” pre-existing and establishing it; thus we have a very strong and (I believe) required apophatic element in monotheist metaphysics, as negative approaches to divinity are (I think) required for deities as such, considering their ultimate transcendence.
However, if we are to follow Margaret McCabe’s contention that Plato is not, like Aristotle, “concerned with the notion of existence (nor with the attendant problems of the verb“to be”…)”, but is instead focused “on identifiable individuals, just because individuals, ones, are what is basic and identifiable.” – with the attendant consequence that “The problems of “being,” therefore, are attached to whether, and how, we can determine that something is an individual; and whether that can be done without precluding its being the possessor of properties as well.” – then we are confronted with a basic and very profound realization that breaks any attempt at an “ultimate ontology”[1] – considered as precluding novel ontologies and other possible ontologies – into a million pieces.
I have put this in other ways in other blog posts citing Edward Butler’s interpretations of Proclus on the issue of Gods and Being, but I can here make it a bit more abstract and bring out something I think shows the logic in another way, and perhaps take it a bit further: There is no Being itself, if by “Being”, we mean the quality of “to be” taken as an ultimate existing focal point determining all multiplicity (the monotheist appropriation of “pros hen” equivocity). To somewhat paraphrase a statement by Butler which I don’t think is appreciated enough: The consequence is that the oft cited idea that Platonism (and/or so called “Neoplatonism”) is a metaphysics of an absolute singular (even if Apophatic) “One” to “Many” is false. Instead, we have here a “stratification”[2] or articulation of ways in which each thing is “one”, hence Proclus’ first proposition[3].
This, I believe, breaks the impetus to somehow fit all things – all traditions, Gods, sciences – into a fully defined system, chain of being, or what have you. Instead, from the perspective of any system – with its propensities for trying to totalize everything – we have a fundamental chaos of possible and true systems outside, and even potentially within the system itself, in the presence of the individuals that make it up. But this “chaos” is itself a perspective, one from the side of any particular order with respect to its alternatives. Taking the individual in itself, however – due to the fact that, on the pain of infinite regress, we must have fundamental individuals (not mere atoms) – they have no opposites. Individuation is existence, as there is nothing that exists – thoughts, ideas, etc – that is not “one” in some fashion. The absolute non-existence of something is a contradiction in terms, since to be something is to exist as a thing, one thing, even if in mere thought. This is Non-duality.
To apply this to the ultimate individuals – Gods – we see how the extreme end of this “non-thirdness”. In one sense, particular determinations of “being” are obviously “third things” mediating existence in some fashion. These are the “kinds”, “genus”, etc. However, at the limits of such structuring, both within each individual and at the edge of the system as a whole, we have a sort of collapse. One might think that, even if the Gods (or individuals in General) are “beyond being”, “Being” might still possess a singularity determining all multiplicity appropriate to it. But, you would be wrong. This would make the God’s entry into Being a sort of “baptism” into something “other” than they are within a context where such othering can take place. It would be an arbitrary ontology, an argument for which would be a vicious circle. In the absence of such a “Being itself”, we have something quite different come into view: Being just is each individual’s unique manifest existence.
In the former idea, Being still functions as a “third thing”, which in this sense is “beyond the Gods”, and individuals. “To be” has a determinate content here the same way forms do. The collapse of this idea, however, reveals the “semantic emptiness” or perhaps “semantic thinness”[4] of “to be”, as an impossibly thin “screen” showing forth the individual ineffable in herself. For theology, the implications are obvious. To put it in a tantalizing way, let me appropriate the form of Aristotle’s famous words, for four different theologies, all true at the same time:
Being is said in many ways, but the primary way is Zeus.
Being is said in many ways, but the primary way is Orunmila.
Being is said in many ways, but the primary way is Mary.
Being is said in many ways, but the primary way is Jesus.
[1] Mary M. McCabe, Plato’s Individuals, 2nd Paperback Edition (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1999).
[2] Steven Dillon, Pagan Portals - Polytheism: A Platonic Approach (Alresford: Moon Books, 2022); Steven Dillon, “Polytheism vs. Classical Theism,” The Analytic Pagan (blog), January 10, 2023, https://theanalyticpagan.com/2023/01/10/polytheism-vs-classical-theism/.
[3] Antonio Vargas, “Proclus’ Elements of Metaphysics,” accessed November 23, 2022, https://www.academia.edu/44841806/Proclus_Elements_of_Metaphysics.
[4] Edward Butler [@EPButler], “This Is Why I Have Said at Various Times That We Must Regard the Concepts of Platonism as Semantically ‘Thin’, or Even Empty, Because They Cannot Be Allowed to Obscure the Theologies (That Is, the Theophanies).,” Tweet, Twitter, October 31, 2020,